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2  An early example of this can be found in Buchanan (1967).
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1. Introduction
Questions regarding voluntary contributions to a public good and the free-riding problem
have so far generated a sizable amount of theoretical modeling and experimental investigation.
1  
The simplest way to model the free-riding problem in public good provision is through a
Prisoners’ Dilemma type of game.
2  A more general approach models the public good provision
decision as a game akin to a Cournot duopoly game.  In this game, each player selects a
contribution level toward the public good.
3  In these models, the public good being provided is
an incremental public good in the sense that the quantity of the public good being consumed
depends on the sum of individual contributions.
One question which has received comparatively little attention in the economic literature
is the problem of providing a public good that can be produced through “weakest-link” or “best-
shot” technologies.
4  The provision of a public service can often be considered a best-shot
decision.  Examples of such situations include driving for a car pool, organizing a fund-raising
event, getting up at night to quiet a crying baby, or slaying the dragon that threatens the village.
5  
In this type of situation, only one individual needs to bear the cost of providing a non-
incremental service that will benefit everyone.  Such a situation is best modeled as a game of6  The game of Chicken is described in several introductory game theory textbooks, for
example in Rasmusen (1989, p. 73).  The game of Chicken is also sometimes referred to as the
Hawk-Dove game, particularly in evolutionary biology.
7  War of Attrition games can be divided into two variants according to whether they are
stationary or not.  See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 119-126) for a description and discussion
of both cases.  The game we investigate experimentally in this paper is non-stationary.
8  See Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson (1988) for a complete characterization of the
equilibria of the War of Attrition game in continuous time.
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Chicken instead of a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
6
One characteristic of a game of Chicken is that it generally has multiple equilibria.  For
example, a two-player game of Chicken has two pure strategy equilibria in which either player
gives in and the other one does not (it also has a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player
gives in with some probability).  To solve this type of game, therefore, one must select an
equilibrium which appears more plausible than others.  Unfortunately, other than the nebulous
concept of a focal point, if any can be found, there is no general method for solving static games
of Chicken.
The situation is different for the dynamic version of the game of Chicken, known as a
War of Attrition.
7  In this game, each player becomes progressively more injured as time wears
on until one gives in and stops the game.  The player giving in first gets a lower payoff than he
would have received if someone else had given in.  In a public service provision context, each
player may choose to wait before volunteering to provide the service, thus avoiding the cost of
providing it if someone else volunteers in the meantime, but no one can enjoy the benefits of the
service until someone provides it.  Like games of Chicken, War of Attrition games also generally
have multiple equilibria in pure and mixed strategies.
8  However, one widely used equilibrium
selection criterion, applicable in multistage and dynamic games, is the concept of subgame9  The concept of subgame perfection is explained in several game theory textbooks, for
example in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 92).
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perfection.
9  In dynamic games, some equilibria are deemed implausible because they rest on
non-credible threats.  Subgame perfection rules them out by insisting that the equilibrium
strategy be optimal for each player not only along the equilibrium path, but at every point in the
game – even those that will never be reached.  When a War of Attrition game is not stationary,
subgame-perfection can be applied to select a unique pure strategy equilibrium.  Given the wide
acceptance of subgame-perfection as an equilibrium selection criterion, it is then tempting to
single out the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution of the game.  This is the
approach taken by Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996).  The present paper is an attempt to verify
experimentally whether this conclusion is warranted.
Our experimental results suggest that it is not.  In 472 three-player War of Attrition
games in which there was a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE), the SPE prediction was
approximately realized only 133 times.  Moreover, we found no statistical difference in the
distribution of volunteers between games that had a unique SPE and similar-looking games with
multiple SPE.  Given this underwhelming support for subgame-perfection, we suggest an ex-post
behavioral hypothesis that better fits the data.  This ex-post behavioral hypothesis is that the
subjects fail to completely account for the strategic nature of the game they are involved in and
approach it essentially as if they were playing against nature.
2. Modeling the Provision of a Public Service
In this section, we present a simplified version of the public service provision game10  Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) model the public service provision decision as a War of
Attrition in continuous time with discounting.  They allow individuals to have different discount
rates and allow the cost of providing the public service to include both a one time cost and an
ongoing cost.  They also allow the benefit of the service to vary depending on who provides it.
11  For completeness, we also need to define the payoffs if two or more players volunteer
simultaneously and if no one ever volunteers. We could do this in many ways; but the simplest
formulation, assuming that both would incur the cost Ci if they volunteer simultaneously and that
all will have a payoff of Tivi if no one ever volunteers, will do.
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modeled in Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996).
10  Consider a group of n individuals who would all
stand to benefit for some time if a public service was provided by one of them.  Each must
decide whether and when to volunteer to provide the public service.  Suppose for simplicity that
time is measured in discrete increments.  Each individual i is characterized by four parameters. 
Let vi be the payoff he receives each period until the service is provided and let ui be the payoff
he receives each period once the public service is provided.  Let Ci be the cost of providing this
service. This cost must be borne entirely by the volunteer at the time he provides the service and
no side payments are possible.  Finally, let Ti be the (finite) time horizon during which he could
benefit from the public service.
If the individual volunteers at time t 0 [ 0, Ti ] , his payoff is tvi + (Ti - t )ui - Ci , while if
someone else volunteers at time t  his payoff is tvi + (Ti - t )ui .  Assume that ui - vi > 0 (everyone
benefits from the public service), Ci > 0 (volunteering is costly), and Tiui > Ci  (volunteering is
not a dominated strategy).  Also assume that every player’s rationality and all the parameters are
common knowledge.  Then, the game is a well-defined War of Attrition in discrete time with
complete information.
11
This game has Nash equilibria in which any one of the players volunteer immediately and
all the others wait.  Intuitively, if player i volunteers immediately then everyone else is better off12  If t1* = t2*  the subgame perfect equilibrium would not be unique.  We will use that
property to test whether subjects play differently in games with and without a unique SPE.
13  To be precise, we should say that individual 1 volunteers at every t between 0 and t1*
and abstains after that, while all others abstain at every t.  A strategy in this game is a complete
statement of what a player would do at every point in the game, including points off the
equilibrium path.
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waiting; and, if everyone else is waiting, then player i is better off volunteering immediately. 
The same holds for all players.
However, only one of these equilibria is selected by subgame-perfection.  To show this,
we note first that since the payoff if no one ever volunteers is Tivi, it is a dominant strategy for i
not to volunteer at any t such that tvi + (Ti - t)ui - Ci  < Tivi.  Since the payoffs are decreasing in t,
we can calculate from this the critical value ti* = Ti  - Ci /(ui  - vi) beyond which i would never
rationally volunteer.  Without loss of generality, order the individuals such that t1* > t2* $ t3* $
... $ tn* .
12  Now, consider individual 1.  If the game reaches t2* or any time between t2* and t1*,
it is optimal for him to volunteer since by then no one else would.  His payoff from volunteering
would still exceed Tivi and would continue to decrease if he waited any longer.  Expecting
individual 1 to volunteer at t2*, all others would then hold off on volunteering for some interval
immediately preceding t2*.  Therefore, individual 1 could do no better than to volunteer at any
time in this interval.  The others would then hold off volunteering in another preceding interval
and so on until individual 1 volunteers at t = 0 and the others wait.  The game has a unique SPE
in which individual 1 volunteers immediately and all others abstain.
13
The critical value ti* depends on the parameters that characterize each individual and is
increasing in Ti, decreasing in Ci and increasing in (ui  - vi).  So ceteris paribus, the individual7 10 September 2003
with the longest time horizon, the lowest cost of providing the service, or who stands to benefit
the most from the public service will be the one for whom the critical value ti* is the largest.  If
the game unfolds according to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, this individual alone
will volunteer immediately.
3. Laboratory Representation of the Public Service Provision Game
In the public service provision game, players receive a flow of payoffs each period, both
before and after someone volunteers, until they reach the end of their time horizon.  Since they
receive a smaller payoff until the public service is provided, waiting is costly: The maximum
possible payoff a player could receive is Tiui  if someone else volunteers immediately, and each
period spent waiting for a volunteer reduces this maximum by (ui  - vi).  To replicate this type of
environment in the laboratory, subjects were given an initial endowment, Ei, and were told that
this would be their payoff if someone took action immediately to stop the game.  Subjects were
also told that their payoff would decline at the rate of si per second until one of them took action
to stop it.  The cost of stopping the game, Ci, if the subject chose to volunteer, would then be
deducted from his payoff.  Stopping the decline of everyone’s payoffs is a public service that the
volunteer provides to everyone at a private cost to himself.  The game played in the laboratory is
strategically equivalent to the public service provision game outlined in section 2 if and only if
Ei = Ti ui and si = (ui - vi) for all players.
There were 14 sessions in this experiment run over the computer network at the
McMaster University Experimental Economics Laboratory in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. 
Twelve subjects participated in each session of the experiment and a total of 168 subjects were8 10 September 2003
recruited from the student population of McMaster University.  Each session of this experiment
consisted of twelve games or rounds (these terms are used interchangeably).
In each round, subjects were randomly assigned to a group with two other subjects. 
These groupings changed every round and no two subjects were in the same group in
consecutive rounds.  At no time were subjects made aware of who were the other members of
their group.  The three parameters (Ei, si and Ci) which characterize the subjects were varied
across subjects systematically.
Table 1 presents the five treatments in the experimental design.  The third column, Ei, is
the subjects’ initial endowment.  The next column, si, shows how much they lost each second
until the game is stopped.  The third column, Ci, lists the cost of providing the service.  When the
entry is a triplet the first value was assigned to subject A, the second to B, and the third to C. 
When there is one entry, all subjects had the same value for that parameter.
The subjects’ endowments, costs and payoffs were initially reported in laboratory dollars
(L$).  Participants were told at the start of their sessions that their laboratory dollar payoffs from
each of the rounds in which they participate will be added up at the end of their sessions and will
be converted to Canadian dollars (C$) at the rate L$1 = C$0.06.  Subjects earned an average of
C$9.50 (the standard deviation was C$0.75) and the range was from C$11.08 to C$7.50. 
Participants also received a “show-up” payment of C$5.00 for arriving on time.  Including the
reading of instructions and answering questions before the rounds began, the twelve rounds were
completed within forty-five minutes and an hour.
All games lasted a maximum of 90 seconds.  In some treatments, the payoffs of some
players decrease to zero before 90 seconds have elapsed.  In this case, the payoffs stop declining9 10 September 2003
and remain at zero until the end of the game.  In other treatments the payoffs of some players are
still positive at t = 90 seconds.  This would then be their payoff if the game ends without a
volunteer.  A player could receive a negative payoff by volunteering at a time when his
remaining payoff was less than Ci.
When a round begins, each subject’s screen displays three graphs: one that represents his
payoff and two representing the payoffs of the two other subjects with whom he was matched. 
Figure 1 presents the screen that would have been seen by player C (labeled “you”) in a round of
Treatment 3.1.  His initial endowment was L$14, the second player had an initial endowment of
L$17, and the third, an initial endowment of L$20.  All three see their payoffs decline by L$0.20
per second until the game is stopped.  Each can stop the game any time at a personal cost of L$5. 
The snapshot was taken 34 seconds after the payoffs had started declining (the timer shows 56
seconds remaining).  At that point, player C’s payoff was down to L$7.20.  Once a player’s
payoff reaches 0 (after 70 seconds for player C and 85 seconds for the second player in this
figure) his payoff stops decreasing.  If time expires (at 90 seconds) without a volunteer, the first
and second players in Figure 1 would receive 0, while the third player would receive L$2 since
his payoff has not reached 0 yet.
On each of the three graphs is a light blue line representing the payoff this subject will
receive if the service is provided by someone else.  As time elapses, this line is filled in
progressively with darker blue until someone stops the game.  Below the blue line, each graph
also contains a white line representing the subject’s payoff if he volunteers.  It extends below the
horizontal axis to show that subjects could receive a negative payoff if they volunteer late in the
game.  This line is filled in with red as the round progresses until someone volunteers to stop it. 14  Go to http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/mceel/papers/bcmvpsin.pdf for the
instructions read to and by participants.
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This gives the subjects a visual indication of their current payoffs at any point in the game. 
Located above the graphs is a button labeled “Action” on which subjects can click using their
computer mouse if they wish to volunteer.
In each round, after the subjects’ computers displayed the screens, subjects were given 15
seconds to make a decision or formulate a strategy before their payoffs started to decline.  This
period was intended to give subjects an opportunity to familiarize themselves with their own
payoffs and the payoffs of the two other subjects with whom they were matched before having to
make a decision.  During these 15 seconds it was possible for one or more subjects to volunteer. 
Anyone volunteering during these 15 seconds of “frozen time” was considered to have
volunteered at time 0.  Subjects were not informed that someone had volunteered until the end of
that 15 second period.
14  Further, subjects were never told whether there were multiple
volunteers.
After this initial 15-second period, the payoffs started to decline until one of the subjects
stopped the game by pushing the button labeled “Action” on his screen.  In this experiment, we
always referred to volunteering as “taking action” in order to prevent framing effects.  Subjects
were never informed of which subject had volunteered; they were only told that someone had.
The critical time ti* is the point at which the payoff from volunteering becomes smaller
than the payoff to letting time expire without a volunteer.  For the first two players in Figure 1
this is the point where the white line crosses the horizontal axis, at 45 and 60 seconds
respectively.  They have no incentive to volunteer beyond that point, although nothing prevents11 10 September 2003
them from pushing the “Action” button anyway and getting a negative payoff for this round.  For
the third player, the payoff to volunteering falls below L$2 after 65 seconds, so from that point
on none of the subjects have incentives to volunteer anymore.  The ti* values for all treatments
are reported in Table 1.
Looking at Table 1, we see that in treatments 1.1 to 2.4 subgame-perfection predicts that
player A will volunteer.  However, since all eight treatments make the same prediction, finding
that player A is the most frequent volunteer wouldn’t be convincing evidence in support of the
subgame-perfection hypothesis because we wouldn’t know whether player A volunteered 
because all the players saw the SPE strategies as the obvious way to play the game or for some
other reason, e.g., simply because he has the lowest cost of volunteering or the highest cost of
waiting.  We designed the other treatments so that similar-looking games would yield different
SPE predictions.
The games in treatments 3.1 to 3.4 are similar to each other.  In each case, subjects’
payoffs have the same cost of volunteering and the same slope (the cost of waiting) but different
starting endowments.  However, the games in treatments 3.1 and 3.2 have a unique SPE while
those in 3.3 and 3.4 do not.  This difference will be used to test whether subjects played
differently in the games that have a unique SPE and those that do not.
In treatments 4.1 to 4.4, subjects’ payoffs had the same endowment and the same cost of
volunteering, but different slopes.  However, in treatments 4.1 and 4.2 the unique SPE has
subject B volunteering while in treatments 4.3 and 4.4 subject C is the predicted volunteer.  This
difference will be used to test whether subjects played differently in games that yielded different
SPE predictions.15  Go to http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/mceel/papers/bcmvpsdata.txt for the
data used in the analysis.
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In treatments 5.1 to 5.4, subjects’ payoffs had the same slope but different initial
endowment and different costs of volunteering.  All four treatments make different SPE
predictions.  Again, we will use these differences to test whether subjects played differently in
these games.
Finally, in treatment 2.1 and 2.3 there is no Nash equilibrium in which player C
volunteers because volunteering is a dominated strategy for him.  This difference will be used to
test whether subjects played differently in games where some had no incentive to ever volunteer.
4. Experimental Results
In the games that have a unique SPE, the subgame-perfection refinement yields a clear
prediction: the subject with the largest  ti* value will volunteer immediately and all others will
wait.  The performance of the SPE prediction is summarized in Table 2.
15   In the 472 rounds of
our experiments in which there was a unique SPE, this prediction was exactly realized only 97
times.  This is an accuracy of just 20%.  However, it could be argued that including the rounds in
which the predicted subject volunteered shortly after time 0 is reasonable because in the
laboratory environment it is not a large deviation for a subject to wait until the count-down
actually begins before volunteering.  Including the rounds in which the predicted subject
volunteered after 1 or 2 seconds increases to 133 the number of rounds in which the SPE
prediction was approximately realized.   Even if we included the rounds in which the predicted
subject waited more than two seconds before volunteering (there were 61 such rounds with an16  This includes 37 rounds in which the predicted subject volunteered simultaneously
with at least one other.
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average stopping time of 13 seconds), this would still be a success rate of only about 41%.  By
comparison, subjects other than the one predicted by the subgame-perfection refinement
volunteered first 273 times and 5 rounds had no volunteer.  The identity of volunteers by
treatment is presented in Table 3.
Nonetheless, the subject identified by the subgame-perfection refinement volunteered in
almost 49% of the rounds
16.  In 11 of the 17 treatments that had a unique SPE, the predicted
subject volunteered more often than the others, sometimes (e.g., in 1.4) up to three quarters of
the time.  So it is worth verifying whether it is the presence of a unique SPE or some other factor
that is driving these observations.
We compared the distributions of volunteers observed in each sub-treatment of
Treatments 1 through 5.  Overwhelmingly, in all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no significant difference against the alternative hypothesis that there are significant differences
among the distributions of volunteers within a treatment.  In treatments 1 and 2, for which each
sub-treatment had the same unique SPE, there was no significant difference in the pattern of play
across sub-treatments ((χ
2 test, p > 0.500 for treatment 1 and p > 0.300 for treatment 2).  In
treatment 3, there was no significant difference in the pattern of play between games with a
unique SPE and games with multiple SPE (χ
2 test, p > 0.800).  In treatment 4, we observed the
same pattern of play when subgame-perfection predicted that subject C would volunteer as when
it predicted that subject B would volunteer (χ
2 test, p > 0.100).  In treatment 5, we also observed
no significant differences in the pattern of play even though each sub-treatment yielded different14 10 September 2003
SPE predictions (χ
2 test, p > 0.300).  Therefore, even in the rounds where the SPE prediction was
accurate, it appears that this was just a coincidence and that something else was guiding the
subjects’ decisions.  Incidentally, even the presence of a dominated strategy didn’t seem to affect
the pattern of play:  we observed the same patterns in treatments 2.1 and 2.3 where volunteering
was a dominated strategy for player C as in treatments 2.2 and 2.4 in which volunteering was not
dominated.
Table 4 reports the frequency distributions of the time elapsed before the first subject
took “action” and Figure 2 shows the cumulative incidence of volunteering in the first 20
seconds of each game.  Of the 544 rounds played, the median time was 0 (54% of the rounds
were stopped at t = 0) and the median time for “action” in the remaining rounds occurred in the
fourth second.  Even if volunteering immediately can be extended through the first couple of
seconds of a round, this leaves approximately 28% of the rounds without a volunteer after the
first two seconds.  Unless these subjects were playing a mixed strategy and randomizing their
stopping time, this observation suggests that many subjects were either expecting someone else
to stop the game and needed a few seconds to revise their strategy once they saw that the payoffs
were continuing to decline, or, had deliberately chosen to wait some time in the hope that
someone else would volunteer first.  We will explore this possibility below.
5. Discussion
5.1 Subgame-Perfection
Three main reasons lead us to doubt the appropriateness of subgame-perfection as an
equilibrium selection criterion in this experimental context.17  A description of the two-stage entry-deterrence game can be found in several
introductory game theory textbooks,  for example in Rasmusen (1989, pp.85-87).  This game has
two Nash equilibria in pure strategy (Stay Out; Fight) and (Enter; Collude); however, only the
second is subgame-perfect.
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First, subgame-perfection is an equilibrium selection criterion whose purpose is to
eliminate implausible equilibria, namely those that rest on non-credible threats.  For example, in
a simple two-stage entry-deterrence game, the implausibility of the non-subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome is apparent to any casual observer.
17  In this case, predicting that this or
some other similar game would unfold according to the SPE prediction seems warranted. 
However, in a War of Attrition game such as the one induced in our experiments, it is not clear
that any of the Nash equilibria are implausible.  Individual A taking action and the other two
abstaining sounds just as plausible as individual B or C taking action and the other two
abstaining.  Instead, it is the application of subgame-perfection which seems rather implausible,
as the mere statement of the subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy (player A volunteers at all t
between 0 and tA* ) seems to defy common sense (a natural reaction to this statement is: how can
player A volunteer at all t if he is stopping the game at t = 0?).  Many subjects may have simply
conceived their strategy as a particular stopping time, e.g., “wait 4 seconds,” rather than as a
conditional statement outlining what they would do at every point of the game if this point was
reached, e.g., “wait 4 seconds then push the action button, but if for some reason that doesn’t
stop the game then continue pushing the action button repeatedly every second until 65 seconds
have elapsed and stop pushing the action button after that.”  Unless subjects defined their
strategies in this fashion in their mind (and we doubt that they did), they would be unable to even
notice that a particular strategy combination may not be best responses to each other, say,18  Past experimental research has so far failed to find convincing evidence that subjects
in sequential decision games systematically play subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies; this is
particularly true for complex games or games involving long decision chains.  See for example
Roth (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993, pp.102-109).




Second, even if they had defined their strategy sets correctly in their minds, identifying
the subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies may be too difficult for most subjects.  Contrary to a
simple Prisoner’s Dilemma, subjects do not have a dominant strategy in a War of Attrition game. 
Selecting a best response to every strategy combination by the other players requires
recalculating an optimization problem for each of their strategies.  Figuring out an equilibrium
strategy combination is even more complex than merely selecting a best response.  It requires
that each player solve the game not only from his point of view but also from the point of view
of all the other players; and, they must verify that each is playing a best response to everyone
else.  Verifying subgame-perfection adds an even thicker layer of complexity by requiring that
the players figure out what everyone would rationally do at every point in the game, even those
they are convinced will never be reached.  This may be too complex a task for many subjects,
especially in a laboratory environment in which they only have 15 seconds to decide on a
strategy.
18
Third, even though we provide subjects with complete information about everyone’s
payoffs, we can never truly elicit a game of complete information between them because it is
impossible to insure that everyone’s rationality is common knowledge (i.e., all members of a
group believe that all other members of their group are rational, and their beliefs about others’
beliefs are equally certain and known up to an infinite regress).  If subjects have any doubt about19  Thaler (2000) predicts an increase in the use of descriptive theories such as this in
economics.  Descriptive theories are based on the observance of empirical regularities in the
behavior of human subjects and the context of the economic problem being considered.   
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another’s rationality or about whether anyone doubts anyone else’s rationality, they will be
unable to predict each other’s best responses accurately.  But the ability to accurately predict
everyone’s rational best responses to actions off the equilibrium path is crucial to the application
of subgame-perfection, and the subjects who participated in these experiments almost certainly
lacked this ability.  In fact, before beginning these experiments none of us knew with certainty
how the subjects would behave.  So, it seems likely that the subjects who participated in the
sessions were at least as ignorant as we were about how their opponents would behave.  But if a
player is unsure of how the other players will behave, how should he rationally play this game? 
The answer is definitely not to just play blindly the strategy identified by the subgame-perfection
refinement.  Instead, he would use whatever beliefs he has about the likelihood that other players
will behave in certain ways to determine an optimal strategy.
Since our experimental results confirm these doubts concerning the accuracy of the
prediction that the game will unfold according to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, we suggest
an alternative hypothesis about how subjects may behave in this environment.  It rests on the
hypothesis that instead of looking backward from the end of the game to unravel the equilibria
that do not meet the subgame perfection criterion, subjects will simply compare the expected
benefits and costs of waiting for some time at the beginning of the game.
1920 Another alternative hypothesis is that subjects may have been attempting to coordinate
their actions around a number of seemingly relevant focal points.  We evaluate this hypothesis in
an appendix that we are not including in this paper due to space constraints, but which is
available at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/mceel/papers/bcmvpsfocal.pdf . The “focal
point” hypothesis does not explain the data as well as the “play against nature” hypothesis.
21  This hypothesis is similar to what Nagel (1995) calls “first order beliefs.”  Players who
hold first order beliefs assume that others behave randomly and choose their best response to this
random behavior.  Nagel (1995) contrasts this to zero-order beliefs, in which players simply pick
a strategy at random without forming beliefs about what the others will do, and nth-order beliefs
in which the players reason deeply enough to form beliefs about the (n-1)th order beliefs of the
others.
22  If the individual did not know g(t), we could reinterpret it as his belief about the
probability that nature would take action at time t.  Since we would then have to consider the
possibility that the player could update these beliefs every second of the game, this would
complicate the analysis without shedding additional light on the question at hand.
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5.2. Play Against Nature 
20
If subjects are unable to quickly and accurately forecast each other’s strategies, they will
approach this game as if they were playing against an unpredictable opponent instead of against
two other purposeful players and will simply choose a waiting time that equates the expected
cost and benefit of waiting an additional second.
21  The benefit of waiting is that it increases the
probability that someone else will stop the game first and therefore that the player will avoid the
cost of volunteering.  The cost of waiting is the loss of payoff if no one else has stopped the
game by then.
Suppose that Nature takes action randomly at some time t according to a (discrete)
probability distribution g(t) over [0, Ti] known by i.
22  We could also interpret g(t) as the
subjective belief that someone else will volunteer at time t.  There may be a positive probability
that nature takes action at t = 0 and so g(0) $ 0.  Furthermore, g(Ti) $ 0 allows for a positive
probability that nature will not take action during individual i’s time horizon.  Normalizing19 10 September 2003
payoffs so that vi = 0 for simplicity, individual i’s payoff from taking action at time t against an
opponent who plays according to g(t) is:
                                                                              t - 1                                                           t - 1
                           Pi (t) = {1 - 3 g(j)}[ si(Ti - t) - Ci] + 3 g(j) [ si (Ti - j)] (9)
                                              
 j = 0                                                          j = 0
The first term on the right-hand side is the expected payoff if nature has not taken action by time
t and individual i takes action himself.  In this case, he pays the cost Ci and receives si from time
t through Ti.  The second term is the expected payoff if nature takes action before time t.  In this
case the individual receives si from that time on through Ti .  It is noteworthy that Pi (t) is not
necessarily decreasing monotonically in t, so volunteering at t = 0 is not necessarily optimal. 
Ex-ante, given their incomplete information, it may even be optimal for everyone to wait before
taking action or even for everyone to volunteer at t = 0. The specific form of the function
depends upon g(t).
Given this expected payoff function, the individual will choose to take action at the time t
which maximizes Pi(t).  The expected gain from waiting one more second is: 
                                                                                     t
                                    Pi (t+1) - Pi (t) = g(t)Ci - {1 - 3 g(j)}si (10)
                                                                                   
 j = 0
The first term to the right of the equal sign contains the probability of avoiding the cost Ci by
waiting one more second and the second term contains the probability of losing the return si if
nature does not act by time t.  The trade-off between taking action and waiting is clear: Each
second the individual waits costs him si if nature does not take action; however, this increases the
probability that nature will take action in the next second sparing him the cost Ci .  Ceteris
paribus, the larger Ci , the longer an individual will choose to wait before taking action, and the
larger si , the shorter the time the individual will choose to wait before taking action.  It is20 10 September 2003
noteworthy that the time horizon, Ti, and the initial endowment, Ei, do not appear in the equation. 
When individuals have incomplete information, or are unable to accurately forecast others’
strategies, the decision of how long to wait before taking action depends only on the expected
gain and cost of waiting and Ti and Ei are irrelevant to this decision.
If individuals have the same beliefs, this hypothesis leads to the following predictions: In
the treatments in which individuals differ with respect to the cost of volunteering, Ci, (Treatments
1 and 5) the one with the smallest Ci will wait the shortest time before taking action.  In
Treatments 2 and 4 where individuals differ with respect to the cost of waiting, the individual
with the highest cost of waiting will wait the least.  If the individuals do not differ with respect to
Ci or si (Treatment 3), we cannot predict who will wait the least, thus a default prediction of
random behavior is maintained. 
In the 224 rounds in which subjects differed according to Ci (Treatments 1 and 5), the
subject with the lowest Ci volunteered 145 times, the subject with the middle Ci volunteered 67
times, and the subject with the highest Ci volunteered only 46 times.  In the 224 rounds in which
subjects differed according to si  (Treatments 2 and 4), the subject with the highest cost of
waiting volunteered 123 times, the subject with the middle cost of waiting volunteered 69 times,
and the subject with the lowest cost of waiting volunteered only 49 times.  In both cases, the
distribution of volunteers is significantly different from a random draw.  By contrast, in the 96
rounds in which subjects did not differ by either Ci or si (Treatment 3), the three subjects
volunteered 43, 29 and 36 times each.  These numbers are not significantly different from a23  The χ
2 statistic for the test of the hypothesis that all three subjects volunteer as often as
each other is 63.28 for treatments 1 and 5, 36.48 for treatments 2 and 4 and 2.72 for treatment 3. 
The critical value of the χ
2 statistic with 2 degrees of freedom at a 5% significance level is 5.99.
21 10 September 2003
random draw.
23  
It is worth noting that the play-against-nature hypothesis does not predict that the
individual with the lowest cost of volunteering (or the highest cost of waiting) will always
volunteer first.  The decision of how long to wait also depends on the players’ unobserved
beliefs, g(t).  What the play-against-nature hypothesis predicts is that the subjects who have a
lower cost of volunteering or a higher cost of waiting should be observed to volunteer more often
because they tend not to wait as long.  This is exactly what we observed.  Over Treatments 1, 2,
4, and 5, for which the PAN hypothesis predicts nA > nB  > nC  where ni is the number of rounds
in which subject i volunteers, we observed nA  = 268,  nB  = 136 and nC  = 95.  We can reject the
null hypothesis that the true distribution is a random distribution of volunteers across the three
subject types (χ
2 = 98.29,  p = 0.000).  In addition to this overall observation, this order is
observed in all four treatments ([88, 27, 26], [53, 24, 23], [70, 45, 26], and [57, 40, 20]). 
Because of the smaller sample size the numbers are not as unambiguous when we break down
the data by sub-treatment, but nonetheless in 13 of 16 sub-treatments  nA > nB , in 9 of 13 nB  >
nC, and in 15 of 16 nA > nC.
Looking at the correlation between the stopping time and the size of the parameters Ci
and si, we ought to observe fewer multiple volunteers and longer stopping times in treatments
1.2, 1.4, 3.3 and 3.4 where the cost of waiting is small (si  = 0.1) than in treatments 1.1, 1.3, 3.1,
3.2 and 5.1-5.4 where it is large (si = 0.2).  The data only weakly confirm that this is what
happened: when si  is smaller, we observed fewer multiple volunteers at t = 0 (11% of the rounds24  Using a χ
2 test we cannot reject the null hypotheses that si has no effect on the number
of multiple volunteers when t = 0 and that si has no effect on the number of rounds that end at t =
0.  A t-test on the difference between the mean stopping times when si = 0.1 and si  = 0.2 does
not permit us to reject the null hypothesis that the mean stopping times are the same.
25  Using a χ
2 test we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of multiple
volunteers is the same across the three values of Ci , but we can reject the null hypothesis that the
proportion of games ending at t = 0 is the same across the three values of Ci .  Pairwise one-sided
Fisher exact tests support the conclusion that the negative relationship between Ci and the
proportion of games ending at t = 0 is significant.  Finally, t-tests on the differences between
mean stopping times support the significance differences in all pairwise comparisons of average
stopping times.
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when si = 0.1 and 16% when si = 0.2), fewer games ending at t = 0 (54% when si = 0.1 and 60%
when si = 0.2), but nearly identical average stopping times (3.72 seconds when si =  0.1 and 3.78
seconds when si =  0.2).
24  It may be that the differences in the costs of waiting in these
experiments (10 cents versus 20 cents per second) are not large enough to prompt significantly
different waiting times.  It would have been interesting to see whether subjects would have
waited significantly longer if waiting had cost them only 1 or 2 cents per second instead.
The same analysis can be made regarding the cost of volunteering.  We ought to observe
fewer multiple volunteers and longer stopping times in treatments 2.1 and 2.3 (Ci  = 10) than in
treatments 2.2, 2.4, 3.1, 3.3, 4.1 and 4.3 (Ci = 5), and the shortest stopping time in treatments 3.2,
3.4, 4.2 and 4.4 (Ci = 1).  The data strongly confirm that this is what happened: When Ci is
larger, we observed fewer multiple volunteers at t = 0 (6% of the rounds when Ci = 10, 7.5%
when Ci = 5, and 14% when Ci = 1), fewer games ending at t = 0 (29% when Ci = 10, 44% when
Ci = 5, and 71% when Ci = 1), and longer average stopping time (17 seconds when Ci = 10, 5
seconds when Ci = 5, and 1 second when Ci = 1).
25  These data confirm that subjects tended to
wait longer when the cost of volunteering was higher, as predicted by the play-against-nature23 10 September 2003
hypothesis.
The predictive performance of the PAN hypothesis can be compared to that of subgame-
perfection if we look at the treatments in which the subject predicted to volunteer most by the
PAN hypothesis is not the player predicted to volunteer by the SPE hypothesis.  In treatments
4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 5.3 and 5.4 the subject predicted to volunteer by SPE did so in 51 of 176
rounds, while the subject predicted to volunteer the most often by the PAN hypothesis did so in
99 rounds.  The PAN prediction was correct twice as often as the SPE prediction.  Not only does
the PAN hypothesis fit the data well, but it’s predictive power is clearly superior to subgame-
perfection.
6. Conclusions
Who will volunteer to do a job that everyone thinks should be done but that everyone
would rather let someone else do?  The evidence from the experiments we conducted shows that
the answer is not as clear as the theory predicted.  Subjects did tend to behave in a systematic
manner: in most rounds someone volunteered immediately or fairly quickly (73% of the rounds
ended within the first 2 seconds), and very few rounds (1%) ended without a volunteer. 
However, our data contradict the hypothesis that subjects saw their subgame-perfect equilibrium
strategies as the obvious way to play the game.  The SPE hypothesis had very poor predictive
power, being approximately correct in only 28% of the rounds.  Moreover, even in the cases
where the SPE prediction was realized, the subjects’ play was likely governed by other
considerations since they appeared to play the same way in games with and without a unique
SPE.  We proposed a simple behavioral hypothesis to explain the observed data: the participants26 See Kreps (1990) p. 536-543 for a discussion and other examples.
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in our sessions were unable to predict how the others would play, and therefore tried to
maximize their expected payoffs by choosing a waiting time that equates the expected cost and
benefit of waiting an additional second – as if they were playing against an unpredictable
opponent.  We called this hypothesis “play-against-nature”(PAN).  The data on the timing and
identity of volunteers is generally consistent with this hypothesis, and its predictive power is
much superior to the SPE prediction.
We can draw two important lessons from this exercise.  First, we are reminded yet again
that even though useful insights about incentives and strategic behavior may be obtained from
complete information models, one should be cautious to extend the predictions obtained from
these models to actual strategic interaction situations.  Since it is impossible to insure that the
rationality of all the subjects involved in a game is common knowledge, we cannot generate a
game of complete information in the laboratory setting, much less expect to observe one in the
field.  This is significant because even if all players are fully rational, backward induction
reasoning can break down completely when the slightest bit of incomplete information is
introduced.
26  Second, these experiments also suggest that given homo sapiens’ limited cognitive
ability, decision-making time is a relevant factor in experimental design.  Figuring out how the
other subjects would play may have been too complex a task in the time we allowed them to
make a decision.  We may wonder, for example, whether subjects would have played the same
way if they had been given 24 hours to research and think about a strategy instead of 15 seconds.
This is an issue for further research.25 10 September 2003
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Table 1     Experimental Design
Treatment
Parameter
     Set
Observations Ei si Ci ti* SPE Prediction
1.1 32 20 0.2 1, 3, 5 85, 75, 65 A
1.2 32 20 0.1 1, 3, 5 80, 60, 40 A
1.3 32 10 0.2 1, 3, 5 44, 34, 24 A
1.4 32 10 0.1 1, 3, 5 80, 60, 40 A
2.1 24 18, 12, 6 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 10 26, 9, - A
2.2 24 18, 12, 6 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 5 42, 34, 9 A
2.3 24 20, 15, 10 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 10 24, 16, - A
2.4 24 20, 15, 10 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 5 36, 32, 24 A
3.1 24 20, 17, 14 0.2 5 65, 59, 44 A
3.2 24 20, 17, 14 0.2 1 85, 79, 64 A
3.3 24 20, 17, 16 0.1 5 40, 40, 40 A,B,C
3.4 24 20, 17, 16 0.1 1 80, 80, 80 A,B,C
4.1 32 20 0.4, 0.2, 0.1 5 36, 65, 40 B
4.2 32 20 0.4, 0.2, 0.1 1 46, 85, 80 B
4.3 32 10 0.4, 0.2, 0.1 5 11, 24, 40 C
4.4 32 10 0.4, 0.2, 0.1 1 21, 44, 80 C
5.1 24 16, 18, 20 0.2 1, 5, 10 74, 64, 40 A
5.2 24 16, 18, 20 0.2 1, 3, 5  74, 74, 65 A,B
5.3 24 10, 15, 20 0.2 1, 5, 10 44, 49, 40 B
5.4 24 10, 15, 20 0.2 1, 3, 5  44, 59, 65 C
Note:  The first 8 sessions included treatments 1, 2 and 4.  The data from treatment 2 were inaccurately recorded
because of a programming error.  These data are not reported.  The next 6 sessions included treatments 2, 3, and 5. 
These treatment 2 data are reported.  
          For some parameter combinations, a player’s payoff would still have been positive at t=90.  If the game ended
without a volunteer, the payoff he received was then Ei - 90 si.  For other parameter combinations, a player’s payoff
would have decreased to zero before t=90.  In this case, the payoff function had a kink and followed the horizontal
axis from that point on until the end of the game.  Due to a programming glitch subjects received one second’s
payoff, si, instead of 0.  This shortens the ti* values by one second.  The values of ti* are therefore calculated as ti* =
min {90 - Ci/ si , (Ei - Ci)/si - 1}.29 10 September 2003
Table 2     Summary of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Prediction Performance
Description Number of Rounds Percentage
Predicted subject volunteers immediately, all others wait 97 20%
Predicted subject waits 1 or 2 seconds 36 8%
Predicted subject waits more than 2 seconds
(average stopping time: 13 seconds)
61 13%
Multiple volunteers at time 0 (including predicted
subject)
37 8%
Another subject volunteers but not the predicted subject 236 50%
No one volunteers 5 1%
Total 472 100%
Note: Totals exclude treatments 3.3, 3.4 and 5.2 in which there was not a unique SPE30 10 September 2003
Table 3     Identity of Volunteers by Treatment (Predicted Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Volunteers are Identified with Bold Font)
Participant
Treatment A B C









3.2 11 71 1
3.3 8 8 10
3.4 12 6 9
4.1 21 8 6
4.2 14 16 6
4.3 20 6 8
4.4 15 15 6
5.1 16 73
5.2 12 11 8
5.3 13 11 7
5.4 16 11 2
Note: Rows do not always total 32 or 24 because there were multiple volunteers in some rounds. 
In some other rounds time ran out and no one volunteered.31 10 September 2003
Table 4     Frequency Distributions and Medians of Times at which Action was taken and Number of Multiple
Volunteers by Treatment
Treatment
Time Elapsed Before a Volunteer Takes Action (in seconds)
Multiple
Volunteers 0 1 to 2  3 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 89 No
Volunteer
Median
1.1 17 8 5 1 0 1 0 0 6
1.2 16 7 2 5 0 2 0 0.5 4
1.3 16 4 5 3 1 3 0 0.5 1
1.4 16 6 6 2 2 0 0 0.5 2
Sub-total 65 25 18 11 3 6 0 1 13
2.1 7 4 4 1 3 3 2 4 1
2.2 10 4 2 6 1 1 0 1 1
2.3 7 4 2 3 0 5 3 4.5 2
2.4 9 5 5 2 3 0 0 1 2
Sub-total 33 17 13 12 7 9 5 2 6
3.1 7 4 2 6 3 2 0 4 2
3.2 19 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
3.3 10 8 0 1 1 3 1 1 3
3.4 19 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
Sub-total 55 19 4 8 4 5 1 0 13
4.1 18 5 1 3 3 2 0 0 3
4.2 21 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
4.3 17 5 3 5 1 1 0 0 1
4.4 20 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 4
Sub-total 76 29 7 8 4 4 0 0 12
5.1 19 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 2
5.2 16 3 2 1 0 2 0 0 7
5.3 14 5 2 0 2 1 0 0 6
5.4 16 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 4
Sub-total 65 9 7 5 4 6 0 0 19
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Figure 2     Cumulative Distributions of Volunteers over Time by Treatment